Canadian Prime Minister

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Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his wife Laureen have arrive in Israel today (Sunday) on an official four-day visit. The Canadian Prime Minister is accompanied by ministers, MPs and business people. This is Harper’s first visit to Israel and the first by a serving Canadian Prime Minister since 2000.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his wife Sarah will welcome Harper and his wife in an official ceremony Sunday afternoon at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. The Netanyahus will later host the Harpers for dinner at their official residence in Jerusalem.

On Monday, Prime Minister Harper will be the first Canadian Prime Minister to address the Knesset.

On Tuesday morning, the Canadian PM will meet with President Shimon Peres and attend a joint meeting of the Israeli and Canadian governments at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. The Netanyahus will, afterwards, accompany the Harpers to Yad Vashem. An official dinner for Prime Minister Harper, his wife and the accompanying delegation will be held Tuesday evening in Jerusalem.

On Wednesday, the Harpers will tour Christian holy sites in northern Israel, after which they will go to Tel Aviv University, where Prime Minister Harper will receive an honorary doctorate and meet with students.

Prime Minister Netanyahu and Prime Minister Harper have previously met in London in April 2013 and in Ottawa in March 2012.

Harper: Through fire and water, Canada will stand with you

 

Canadian PM met with many standing ovations, but in the end, was treated like family and interrupted by Arab MKs who relegated him to the Likud’s benches.

Stephen Harper, January 20, 2014

Stephen Harper, January 20, 2014 Photo: GPO/AMOS BEN GERSHOM

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper received a very warm welcome in the Knesset Monday.

The first speech in the Knesset by a Canadian prime minister was peppered with standing ovations, the enthusiastic likes of which may not have been seen since Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu addressed the US Congress in 2011.

Statements like “through fire and water, Canada will stand with you” were met with rousing rounds of applause, and though clapping is against Knesset protocol, even Speaker Yuli Edelstein joined in.

The Canadian premier said he believes “it is right to support Israel because, after generations of persecution, the Jewish people deserve their own homeland and deserve to live safely and peacefully in that homeland.

“Let me repeat that: Canada supports Israel because it is right to do so,” he emphasized. “It is… a Canadian tradition to stand for what is principled and just, regardless of whether it is convenient or popular.”

“The friendship between [Israel and Canada] is rooted in history, nourished by shared values, and it is intentionally reinforced at the highest levels of commerce and government as an outward expression of strongly held inner convictions,” Harper said in French and English.

Some of those shared values are “freedom, democracy and rule of law,” in which Israel “has long anchored itself,” he said.

“These are not mere notions,” he added. “They are the things that, over time and against all odds, have proven to be the only ground in which human rights, political stability and economic prosperity may flourish.”

Palestinians also deserve these things, Harper said, expressing support for “a viable, democratic Palestinian state, committed to living peacefully alongside the Jewish state of Israel,” though, “sadly, we have yet to reach that point.”

“I believe that a Palestinian state will come, and one thing that will make it come is when the regimes that bankroll terrorism realize that the path to peace is accommodation, not violence,” Harper stated.

Despite the nearly wall-towall support for Harper’s words as expressed by the many standing ovations, the “robustness of Israeli democracy,” as Netanyahu called it, was demonstrated several times with Arab MKs interrupting the Canadian minister as he spoke about anti-Semitism in some criticisms of Israel.

“We have witnessed in recent years the mutation of the old disease of anti-Semitism and the emergence of a new strain…. People who would never say they hate and blame the Jews for their own failings or the problems of the world, instead declare their hatred of Israel and blame the only Jewish state for the problems of the Middle East. As once Jewish businesses were boycotted, some civil-society leaders today call for a boycott of Israel,” Harper stated.

“Don’t mislead; we want to boycott settlements,” MK Ahmed Tibi (UAL-Ta’al) interrupted in English.

“Most disgracefully of all, some openly call Israel an apartheid state,” Harper continued, as MK Taleb Abu Arar (UAL-Ta’al) shouted: “It is.”

“Think about the twisted logic and outright malice behind that: a state, based on freedom, democracy and the rule of law, that was founded so Jews can flourish, as Jews, and seek shelter from the shadow of the worst racist experiment in history, [a state] that is condemned – and that condemnation is masked in the language of anti-racism. It is nothing short of sickening. But this is the face of the new anti-Semitism,” Harper went on.

Tibi pointed at the coalition’s side of the plenum, shouting “That’s where the Likud sits; you should be there,” and then he and Abu Arar demonstratively walked out as the audience cheered Harper for his comments against anti-Semitism.

“What else can we call criticism that selectively condemns only the Jewish state and effectively denies its right to defend itself while systematically ignoring – or excusing – the violence and oppression all around it?” the Canadian prime minister asked. “What else can we call it when Israel is routinely targeted at the United Nations, and when Israel remains the only country to be the subject of a permanent agenda item at the regular sessions of its human rights council?” Edelstein, who spoke before Harper, commented to him after his speech: “You’re not a guest, you’re family, because there were interruptions, which is unusual for foreign guests.”

Earlier, Netanyahu gave a speech in support of Harper, breaking protocol to give large swaths of it in English.

“You are a true friend in Israel,” he said. “The people in Israel thank you for your steadfast support.”

Netanyahu commended Harper for his “courage to stand for the truth and courage to say it” when faced with people “who try to deny the connection between [the Jewish people] and our land. You know the facts of our past well.”

Describing the necessity of security arrangements in the event of a peace agreement, Netanyahu quipped: “If I’m not mistaken, Yonge Street [in Toronto] is longer than the State of Israel, so we have no margin of error.”

“There are thousands of miles between the large Canada and the small – larger than life but physically small – Israel, but our nations are close.

It’s deep in our hearts,” Netanyahu stated. “We will always see Canada as a close friend.”

Opposition leader Isaac Herzog (Labor) dedicated much of his speech to the Toynbee- Herzog debate at McGill University in 1961, in which his uncle, then-ambassador to Canada Yaakov Herzog, debated notoriously anti-Semitic British historian Arnold Toynbee.

“Since you’re part of the family, I won’t hide our disagreements,” Herzog said. “I believe we need to separate ourselves from the Palestinians while protecting Israeli security.

We need a Palestinian state near an Israeli one, based on 1967 lines with land swaps while annexing settlement blocs… We have to try everything for peace and back the great effort US Secretary of State John Kerry is investing and give him a chance,” Herzog stated.

“Enough is enough,” he added in English, and in a reference to Canadian-Jewish singer-songwriter Leonard Cohen called to “let the dove free.”

Herzog also did not miss the chance to take a dig at Netanyahu and his breach of protocol, pointing out that “the official languages here are Hebrew and Arabic, not English.”

Prime Minister Netanyahu said Sunday, “Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper is a great friend of the State of Israel. He has strongly opposed against attempts to delegitimize the State of Israel and has taken a praiseworthy moral stand against these attempts. I welcome his arrival together with his wife and the members of his delegation. We will work together to further enhance the important relations between our two countries.”

NAFTALI BENNETT: PALESTINIAN STATE WILL DESTROY ISRAEL’S ECONOMY

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IN PASSIONATE SPEECH, BENNETT SLAMS TWO-STATE SOLUTION, THOSE CLAIMING PEACE TALKS IN ISRAEL’S ECONOMIC BENEFIT. ‘FOR DECADES THERE HAS BEEN DESIRE TO DIVIDE ISRAEL, EXCUSE KEEPS CHANGING: FIRST IT WAS PEACE, THEN DEMOGRAPHICS, NOW ECONOMICS’TO HIS VISUAL AID, BENNETT CAME ARMED WITH A MAP OF ISRAEL – WEST BANK INCLUDED – IN WHICH HE PORTRAYED JUDEA AND SAMARIA AS A MOUNTAINOUS SHIELD PROTECTING CENTRAL ISRAEL FROM WEST BANK PALESTINIANS. RELATED STORIES: 

POINTING TO THE MAP, BENNETT SAID: “COPY PASTE WHAT HAPPENED IN SDEROT TO THE REST OF ISRAEL. HOW WILL ISRAEL’S ECONOMY LOOK IF A ROCKET WILL FALL IN SHENKAR STREET IN CENTRAL HERZLIYA? WHAT IF ONCE A YEAR A PLANE WILL CRASH AT BEN GURION AIRPORT?” POINTING TO HIS SECOND VISUAL AID, A GRAPH SHOWING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND GROWTH OF ISRAELI ECONOMY, BENNETT MADE THE CLAIM THAT PEACE TALKS, AND THEIR ENSUING POLITICAL FALLOUT, HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON ISRAEL’S GROWTH, THE LARGEST ALLEGED DROP BEING REGISTERED AFTER FORMER PRIME MINISTER EHUD BARAK‘S CAMP DAVID TALKS WITH YASSER ARAFET. “ISRAEL BELONGS TO THE JEWISH PEOPLE FOR THOUSANDS OF YEARS, THAT’S A FACT. BUT NOW I AM TALKING ABOUT ECONOMY. “FOR OVER 20 YEARS THERE HAS BEEN A DETERMINATION TO DIVIDE THE COUNTRY, ONLY THE EXCUSE HAS CHANGED. ONCE THEY SAID IT WAS FOR PEACE… THEN (LIVNI SAID) FOR APPEASING THE WORLD, THEN FOR DEMOGRAPHICS AND NOW ECONOMY.”

“WILL WE DIVIDE JERUSALEM BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMY? WILL WE GIVE UP THE GALILEE? OR WILL WE HAND OVER THE NEGEV BECAUSE OF INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON OUR TREATMENT OF THE BEDOUINS.”

Yair Lapid: We need to get rid of the Palestinians

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Yair Lapid is the Minister of finance . His fater was Tommy ” Josef” Lapid the minister of Interior Affairs in a previous government in Israel.

Finance minister tackles numerous pressing issues in Tel Aviv event, says settlements should be funded until evacuated, rabbis should not meddle in issues unrelated to halacha, ‘his brother’ Bennett was demoted to ‘cousin’

In what state is the relationship between Yesh Atid chairman and Habayit Bayehudi chairman, why are the settlements still funded by the State and what will be their future – Finance Minister Yair Lapid addressed all of these pressing questions Friday morning at a Tel Aviv panel event.

When Lapid was asked about the issue of women’s recruitment to the army and his past remarks noting that he would act to dismiss the chief rabbis for going against female IDF recruitment, he said: “I am not the minister responsible for (the chief rabbis), Naftali Bennett is.” The interviewer then comically noted: “Our brother”; yet Lapid cynically replied: “He has been demoted to cousin,” and stressed he believes Bennett should act on this matter.

“We are in an unprecedented struggle on the matter of equality of burden, and I don’t think it is right for the rabbis to say they forbid women from serving in the army. This cannot be and we will act against it, unless they retract their remarks.”

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Lapid was asked about his opinion regarding the offshore bank account held by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the island of Jersey, and responded: “Since the State comptroller said he would look into the matter, it is improper for the finance minister to address this issue beforehand.”

In regards to the affair involving Rabbi Pinto and senior police officers, Lapid provided an interesting commentary: “On an economic level, I want to draw the attention to the fact that the three Israeli tycoons that were notorious for consulting with rabbis are Moti Zisser, Nochi Dankner and Ilan Ben Dov. What is common to all three, apart from consulting with rabbis, is that their empires fell apart.”

Lapid at Tel Aviv panel event, Friday morning (Photo: Yaron Brener)
Lapid at Tel Aviv panel event, Friday morning (Photo: Yaron Brener)

Lapid added: “It saddens me to see Judaism turn into a combination of charms and interference in matters unrelated to them. If I have a rabbi, it’s Rabbi Shai Piron. If you’d ask him what’s the most rabbinical thing he ever did, it’d be adopting a disabled child, because that’s what a true rabbi does. He doesn’t sit with all sorts of high-ranked officers or tycoons and advises them on matters unrelated to Judaism or halacha.” These mixes are not good.”

Lapid stressed that he is not very familiar with the details of the affair but was hopeful that “the senior police officials did nothing wrong. I don’t think it only stains the police, but the chief rabbinate as well. The mixing of these two areas is unfit.”

‘Get rid of Palestinians’

Lapid was later asked about the political negotiation and the document that will soon be brought to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by US Secretary of State John Kerry.

“There will be an outline to the framework agreement which will be discussed in the negotiations,” Lapid said. “It doesn’t mean you agree to anything, it doesn’t mean we think Jerusalem should be divided. It only means that these subjects are under debate as well and we don’t need to be the ones who are insubordinate.”

Lapid: Won't allow a non-democratic Israel (Photo: Yaron Brener)
Lapid: Won’t allow a non-democratic Israel (Photo: Yaron Brener)

“We say – peace is not the issue, we need to get rid of the Palestinians. It threatens us, it chokes us. Ultimately the State ofIsrael cannot continue on while unnaturally absorbing four million Palestinians. Eventually they will tell us, ‘if you don’t want to give us a country of our own, let us vote.’ And then, if we let them vote, it will be the end of the Jewish state. If we won’t let them – it will be the end of a democratic Israel, and I won’t allow that to happen.”

Lapid added: “We will have to pay a price for this breakup. The price now only means they will open up a series of issues within the negotiations, and then we will explain to what we agree and to what we disagree.”

The finance minister showed his support of PM Netanyahu: “I’m in the coalition because this is where things get done. And Yesh Atid bolsters the negotiations and supports the prime minister because he is running them correctly. It is not going to be easy, and every time we’re asked why we don’t resign from the government, I’ll say – to keep it going, not for it to end.”

Despite the political vision he presented, Lapid explained that until the settlements are evacuated, they must be properly funded: “Most of the budget for the Settlements Division is transferred to the Galilee and the Negev. And no new settlements are being established. The agreement requires the evacuation of 80,000-90,000 settlers. It is not only going to change the country, it’s going to change you and me. It will be the biggest Israeli drama since the State’s establishment, in terms of what it does to us. It’s going to be a drama that will tear us from the inside, but until that happens, there are people, good Israeli citizens, who live there, and I think it is perfectly fine to transfer money to continue their lives.”

When asked about the remarks made by Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon about Kerry, he said: “It is indecent. Give credit to the defense minister that he thought he was talking in a private conversation, but even in such conversation he shouldn’t speak this way, and I am glad he apologized because that was the right thing to have done.”

Ben Gurion: . . . if he were caught between the rise of al-Qaeda and Iran and the decline of the United States?

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What Would Ben-Gurion Do

What Would Ben-Gurion Do

David Ben-Gurion with IDF Commander Yossef Nevo and Mayor of Jerusalem Mordechai Ish-Shalom at an army post at the Jerusalem border, 1962. By David Harris.

Ofir Haivry in “Israel in the Eye of the Hurricane” calls for reviving David Ben-Gurion’s activist school of foreign policy. In building his case for the rightness of such a policy, Haivry provides us not only with an insightful survey of the historical development of Israeli strategy but also with a framework for comparing policies across time periods. His approach is particularly helpful in pointing out the complex interconnections among local, regional, and global politics.

But in taking the view from 30,000 feet, Haivry misses the specific dilemma that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now faces: Israel is caught uncomfortably between the decline of American power and the rise of al-Qaeda and Iran.

As Haivry observes, America is pulling back. In the words of former National Security Adviser Tom Donilon, the Obama administration has determined that the United States is “overinvested” in the Middle East. President Obama, therefore, has shown himself to be deeply reluctant to commit the U.S. to any initiative designed to shape a new regional order. This standoffishness has resulted in a power vacuum. The vacuum is most obvious in Syria, where Shiite Iran and Sunni al-Qaeda are both growing increasingly powerful even as they vie with each other for influence.

For Israel, the dilemma arises not so much from America’s withdrawal as from the decidedly partial character of that withdrawal. Although Obama has taken one step out the door, the other foot is still planted firmly in place. At the United Nations General Assembly in September, for example, he targeted two problems for energetic solution: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program. He could not have chosen two issues of greater concern to Israel. While other Middle Eastern leaders complain of an aloof and distant America, the Israeli prime minister finds himself hosting Secretary of State John Kerry nearly once a month. In short, Obama has boxed Netanyahu in.

 

As historical coincidence would have it, however, Ben-Gurion had to grapple with an analogous dilemma, and in doing so his activist school reached the zenith of its influence. In the mid-1950s, as radical pan-Arabism shook the region, the Eisenhower administration, which leaned toward the side of the Arab states, was singularly fixated on solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The best way to achieve that goal, the President believed, was to force Israel to make painful territorial concessions.

And there was more. In 1955, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, the charismatic young leader of Egypt and champion of pan-Arabism, had signed a massive arms deal with the Soviet Union. Eisenhower chose to interpret Nasser’s move as a hedge against Israel rather than a rejection of the West per se. Rolling back Israel could therefore also serve as a means of wooing Nasser away from the USSR.

Not surprisingly, a significant gap in perception opened up between Jerusalem and Washington. The Americans fawned over Nasser; the Israelis increasingly saw him as an existential threat. As a result, Ben-Gurion was forced to adopt a bifurcated strategy. Wherever possible, he showed deference to the United States—making sure, for example, to cooperate with Eisenhower’s Arab-Israeli peace initiative. At the same time, in a practice that enraged the Americans, he did not refrain from launching aggressive border raids against his neighbors, including Egypt.

Events reached a high point in 1956 when, ignoring explicit American warnings, Israel launched a war against Egypt in concert with the French and the British. That coalition was itself very much the product of the preceding two years of Israeli activism. By demonstrating Israel’s willingness to act independently of Washington, and by showcasing considerable military prowess, Ben-Gurion had laid the groundwork for an alliance with France that in the next decade would prove a godsend to the newly independent Jewish state. It was, indeed, the French who roped the British into the coalition against Egypt.

 

Although much has changed since then, there is a good deal to be learned from this historical example. Specifically, if Israel were to revitalize Ben-Gurion’s activism in today’s circumstances, what goals would it pursue?

In addressing this question, Haivry himself argues in favor of “abandoning the preoccupation of the last decades with two issues at the expense of virtually all others: namely, the conflict with the Palestinians and the Iranian nuclear threat.” Ben-Gurion’s track record suggests otherwise, especially with regard to Iran.

In the 1950s, the Israeli leader’s top priority was arresting the advance of Egyptian militarypower. The Soviet arms deal gave Nasser an edge: an advantage that to Ben-Gurion represented a threat on the same order as the Iranian nuclear threat represents to Israel today. Indeed, if Ben-Gurion were reincarnated as an adviser to Netanyahu, he would undoubtedly draw a parallel between the rise of Iran as a nuclear power—and the American posture that has inadvertently facilitated that rise—and his own experience with Nasser.

Just like Egypt in the 1950s, Iran today presents a nexus of three key factors: malevolent intention, lethal capabilities, and strategic determination. None of Israel’s other antagonists on the Middle East scene exhibits such a multidimensional challenge. Al-Qaeda, to be sure, is fearsome. But Sunni jihadism in general is organizationally fragmented, militarily weak, and strategically inept. The danger it poses to Israel is real enough, but hardly rises to the level of an existential threat.

The primacy of the Iranian challenge raises a key question. If Ben-Gurion were alive today, would he urge Netanyahu to follow his example in 1956 and launch a strike against Iran that could, plausibly, turn into full-scale war? The answer is almost assuredly no.

Let’s assume that Israel actually possesses the military capability to destroy the Iranian nuclear program (a big assumption). In the event that led to all-out military confrontation, it would lack great-power support, something that Ben-Gurion regarded as an absolute prerequisite. In 1956, he gave the order to attack only after he had ensured the backing of Britain and France.

Netanyahu enjoys no such support today. Getting into a war with Iran all by himself would be easy enough. But getting out of it would require the good offices of the United States, which he cannot count on.

 

This, however, does not entirely nullify the activist option. Extrapolating from his behavior in 1954-55, but stopping short of war, Ben-Gurion would press forward with the most muscular policy possible, especially through an aggressive covert campaign against the Iranian nuclear program. All the while, using the model of Britain and France in 1956, he would search for actors willing to partner with Israel against Iran on the wider Mideast scene.

Granted, it is not entirely clear that such actors exist; but the possibility is insufficiently explored in Haivry’s analysis. For example, after discussing the three “clusters” of states in today’s Middle East, Haivry writes: “Israel is, to say the least, not a good fit for any of these regional groupings.” He thereby scants one of the most striking developments of the last three years—namely, the confluence of interests between Israel and the Sunni Gulf states, Saudi Arabia first and foremost.

A reincarnated Ben-Gurion would certainly investigate whether behind-the-scenes cooperation between Riyadh and Jerusalem was possible, and whether an activist foreign policy could help to solidify it. The arena offering the greatest potential for such cooperation is Syria, where shifting the balance against Iran’s proxy Hizballah is in the interest of both the Saudis and the Israelis. An additional advantage in Syria is that Netanyahu can act aggressively there without unduly complicating relations with Washington.

Of course, the impediments to cooperation between Jerusalem and Riyadh are considerable, and it would be difficult to pull off even a covert alignment with any effectiveness. But the Middle East is changing rapidly, and the stakes are very high. It would be a mistake to assume that yesterday’s impossibility will remain unthinkable tomorrow.

Who knows? In the process of courting the Gulf states, Netanyahu might even find other partners whose cooperation he could not have foreseen. After all, Ben-Gurion planned neither the alliance with France nor the alignment with Britain. It was his activism that generated both relationships. Activism, he understood, was a form of advertisement.